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on Local Political Elites’ Outlook1 
 
ROXANA MARIN 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 The problématique of the decentralization of public services towards 
the local communities has represented a perennial preoccupation on the agenda 
and within the programmes of the post-communist governments, while its 
legislative realization and, further, the implementation of such a policy have 
generated remarkably diverse – here and there, controversial – outcomes: on the 
one hand, observers and decision-makers praise the benefits of “local 
autonomy” and independent public policy at the local level, accompanied by a 
more meaningful citizens’ participation, on the other hand, contestations are 
voiced through the prism of what is seemed to be a gradual “impoverishment” 
of the small-to-medium sized municipalities, in the absence of the financial 
support provided by the state budget.  
 The question of decentralization is much more conspicuous in periods 
of crisis, as it puts a considerable pressure on the financial situation of the local 
communities which, in a decentralized and devoluted administrative system – 
hence in the absence of the significant sums recouped from the state budget –, 
find themselves forced to collect appreciable taxes in the local budget from a 
population increasingly impoverished by the effects of economic fluctuations. 
In this sense, the degree of de facto decentralization is probably the most 
relevantly illustrated by the average proportion from the local budget of all the 
administrative-territorial units on the area of a state, ensured out of its own, 
independent sources, by the municipalities themselves: within those states with 
a decentralized administrative tradition, the budgetary proportion resulting from 
the collection of taxes from within the local community can constitute up to 
60% of the total of the municipality’s budgetary revenues (e.g. Poland); on the 
                                                 
1
  This paper is part of the doctoral thesis entitled A Descriptive Inquiry into the Local 
Political Elites of East-Central Europe. A Comparative Approach of Tecuci (Romania), 
Česká Lípa (the Czech Republic), Oleśnica (Poland), Gyula (Hungary), Levice (the 
Slovak Republic), and Targovishte (Bulgaria), publicly defended in November 2016. 
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other hand, in countries administratively centralized, the municipalities are 
exposing serious problems in the management of local finances, collecting 
under 30% of the budgetary revenues, while the rest of the income emanates 
from the state budget. This is the case of Romania as well, where the successive 
attempts of decentralization failed to prepare the small communities (i.e. the 
communes, the small-to-medium sized towns) in efficiently collecting and 
effectively administering the local taxes. Meanwhile, after the 1989 momentum, 
the local communities have been entrusted with increasingly broad 
administrative attributions (e.g. the administration of schools and hospitals, the 
management of public security, social welfare, etc.), without the improvement 
of the capacity of collecting taxes in an autonomous fashion.  
 Such municipalities confronted an impoverishment of the local political 
elites’ abilities to initiate and implement local development projects 
(particularly, in the sphere of infrastructural development and of economic 
growth through investments and attraction of private capital); such a 
circumstance has the unfortunate “merit” to constitute itself into a fertile soil for 
unprofitable public vendue, for the exercise of personal influences at the local 
level, for corruption and the perpetuation of “patron-client”-styled relations2. 
 In this context, the present paper attempts to address the puzzle of 
(re)defining and operationalizing the notion of “decentralization”, and to further 
discuss the impact of this process, in practice, on the outlook of the local 
decision-makers. As will be shown in the following sections, there has been a 
general neglect in the literature regarding the effects of decentralization on local 
leadership in the still young democracies of East-Central Europe, the focus 
being shifted instead towards infant democracies outside Europe (China, India, 
Latin America, etc.).   
 
 
  
THEORETICAL DISCUSSIONS ON THE CONCEPT  
OF “DECENTRALIZATION” 
 
 “Administrative decentralization” points to “the existence of some local 
public persons, appointed by the territory’s community, with their own 
attributions, who directly intervene in the management and the administration of 
the community’s problems, including local autonomy”3, a definition which 
poses the problem of the degree of decentralization that is actually favourable to 
                                                 
2
  Cf. Anna Grzymała-Busse, Rebuilding Leviathan: Party Competition and State 
Exploitation in Post-Communist Democracies, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
(UK) & New York, 2007. 
3
  Dana Apostol Tofan, Drept administrativ, ed. a 2-a, rev., vol. I, C.H. Beck, București, 
2008, pp. 253-255. 
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a democratic construct and to an efficient administration, considering different 
factors (e.g. the traditions and the history, the area and the population of the 
state, the dispersion degree of the inhabitants, the economic conditions and the 
political context, etc.).  
 Equally dilemmatic remains also the convenient operationalization of 
the concept of “decentralization”. Adverting on the major discrepancies 
between “administrative decentralization” and “political decentralization”4, 
from a legal perspective, Dana Apostol Tofan5 distinguishes between (a) 
“territorial decentralization”, i.e. “the existence of some elected authorities, at 
the level of the territorial-administrative units, authorities that dispose of 
general material competence”, and (b) “technical decentralization” or 
“decentralization through services”, i.e. “the existence of some moral persons of 
public law, that perform specific public services, distinct from the bulk of public 
services provided for by the state authorities”. 
 All these developments and dynamics are primarily elite-generated, but, 
in turn, they tend to lead to important changes in the local elites’ outlook, 
strategy prioritization, value orientation, and attitudes6. Moreover, different 
degrees of decentralization and diverse forms of decentralized policies are prone 
to determine variations in the local elites’ profile, behaviour or attitudinal 
patterns7. Conversely, Paul Carnegie contends that, generally, structural and 
“institutional reform requires a modification of elite behaviour, however slightly”8. 
 Concretely, decentralization needs the simultaneous fulfilment of the 
following prerequisites: the existence of a local community with its own 
necessary material means (i.e. a local budget), the existence of local decision-
making bodies elected by the community (not by the central authorities, which 
                                                 
4
  Understood as federalism – “the most profound form of decentralization”, a “major 
constitutional option, often associated to some exceptional historical circumstances”. For 
more details on this topic, see Xaviér Frège, La decentralization, Éditions La Découverte, 
Paris, 1986, p. 38. 
5
  Dana Apostol Tofan, Drept administrativ, cit., p. 255. 
6
  Subrata K. Mitra, “Room to Maneuver in the Middle: Local Elites, Political Action, and 
the State in India”, World Politics, vol. 43, no. 3, April 1991, pp. 390-413; A.M.M. 
Shawkat-Ali, “Decentralization for Development: Experiment in Local Government 
Administration in Bangladesh”, Asian Survey, vol. 27, no. 7, July 1987, pp. 787-799; 
Robert L. Crain, Donald B. Rosenthal, “Structure and Values in Local Political Systems: 
The Case of Fluoridation Decisions”, The Journal of Politics, vol. 28, no. 1, February 
1966, pp. 169-195. 
7
  Douglas T. Yates, Neighborhood Democracy: The Politics and Impacts of 
Decentralization, Lexington Books, Lexington (Massachusetts), 1973. 
8
  Paul J. Carnegie, “Democratization and Decentralization in Post-Soeharto Indonesia: 
Understanding Transition Dynamics”, Pacific Affairs, vol. 81, no. 4, Winter 2008/2009, 
pp. 515-525/p. 518. 
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otherwise exert some sort of administrative endorsement for the limit between 
local problems and those of general interests not to be breached)9.  
 The different types of decentralization bear as fundamenta different 
criteria: organizationally, (1) “vertical” (“the power dispersion to bottom on the 
chain of authority”), and (2) “horizontal” (“the transfer of some responsibilities 
to particular organizations outside the central administrative structure”); 
structurally, (1) “functional” (“the recognition of some autonomy of the 
institutions and public services situated at the local level”), and (2) “territorial” 
(“the recognition of some autonomy of the local communities” per se). 
Generally, decentralization is defined as comprising two steps10: (a) “de-
concentration” (in its turn, being either of “vertical structure”, with an 
“unintegrated local administration”, or of “prefectorial structure”, with an 
“integrated local administration”), and (b) “devolution” (“the power transfer 
from the central government to the regional institutions”, as an intermediary 
stage between the central governance and the local one. Devolution can be 
either “administrative” (“the regional institutions only implement the policies 
decided upon at the centre”), or “legislative” (i.e. “the establishment of elected 
regional assemblies, invested with political responsibilities and with a certain 
fiscal independence, a situation which confer them a high degree of manoeuvre 
and decision-making in their area of responsibility”)11.  
 Most recently, Jean-Paul Faguet12 refers to “decentralization” from two 
dimensions, bearing in mind the example of Bolivia:  
 
 “First, it [decentralization] encompasses reforms such as deconcentration, 
devolution, and delegation that in incentive terms are fundamentally different [...] 
Second, the word conceals great variation in the extent to which reform is effectively 
implemented across different countries”13.  
 
 Similarly to Triesman14, in a well-documented contribution on the 
evolution of the concept, Pollitt15 presents a quite rich typology of 
decentralization, which contains, most notably, the distinctions between (a) 
                                                 
9
  James W. Fesler, “Centralization and Decentralization”, in David L. Sills, Robert K. 
Merton (eds.), International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, vol. 2, Macmillan & 
Free Press, New York & London, 1968, pp. 370-379. 
10
  Virgil Stoica, Cine conduce Iașul ?, Editura Fundației AXIS, Iași, 2003, pp. 65-66. 
11
  Andrew Heywood, Politics, Macmillan, London, 1997. 
12
  Jean-Paul Faguet, Decentralization and Popular Democracy: Governance from Below in 
Bolivia, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor (Michigan), 2012. 
13
  Ibidem. 
14
  Daniel Triesman, Defining and Measuring Decentralization: A Global Perspective 
(UCLA manuscript), Department of Political Science, University of California at Los 
Angeles, Los Angeles (California), 2002, pp. 1-38, available at: www.sscnet.ucla.edu/ 
polisci/faculty/treisman/Papers/defin.pdf, accessed on 10.06.2017. 
15
 Christopher Pollitt, “Decentralization: A Central Concept in Contemporary Public 
Management”, in Ewan Ferlie, Laurence E. Lynn, Christopher Pollitt (eds.), The Oxford 
Handbook of Public Management, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005, pp. 371-397. 
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“competitive” (i.e. authority parcelled out on the basis of competition) versus 
“non-competitive” decentralization (i.e. authority parcelled out on the basis of 
allocation); (b) “internal” (i.e. “authority parcelled out within an existing 
organization”) versus “external” decentralization or “devolution” (i.e. “authority 
transferred to other [possibly new] organizations”)16. 
 There is a constant concern within the literature regarding the new 
administrative developments, especially decentralization, and their impact on 
the outlook and orientations of the local/regional political elite. Such a concern 
has been focused primarily on Latin America, South Asia17, and Africa18, while 
the topic has been generally neglected for the developing democracies of East-
Central Europe. 
 Dora Orlansky19 discusses the impact of decentralization upon the 
power-sharing between the central and the local administrative layers and upon 
the extent of political power and responsibility local elites are expected to exert. 
Discussing a series of examples from Africa and South Asia, Devarajan et al.20 
refer to the dangers of elite isolation with the increase in decentralized 
communities and to shifts in delivery of public services once with the process of 
                                                 
16
  Christopher Pollitt, “Decentralization…cit.”, p. 375. 
17
  Victoria A. Beard, Faranak Miraftab, Christopher Silver (eds.), Planning and 
Decentralization: Contested Spaces for Public Action in the Global South, Routledge, 
London & New York, 2008; Paul J. Smoke, Eduardo J. Gómez, George E. Peterson (eds.), 
Decentralization in Asia and Latin America: Towards a Comparative Interdisciplinary 
Perspective, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham Glos (UK) & Northampton (Massachusetts), 
2006; Shahid Javed Burki, Guillermo E. Perry, William R. Dillinger (eds.), Beyond the 
Center: Decentralizing the State, The World Bank, Washington, D.C., 1999; Maria 
Escobar-Lemmon, “Political Support for Decentralization: An Analysis of the Colombian 
and Venezuelan Legislatures”, American Journal of Political Science, vol. 47, no. 4, 
October 2003, pp. 683-697; Pranab Bardhan, “Decentralization of Governance and 
Development”, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 16, no. 4, Fall 2002, pp. 185-
205; Christopher Garman, Stephan Haggard, Eliza Willis, “Fiscal Decentralization: A 
Political Theory with Latin American Cases”, World Politics, vol. 53, no. 2, January 
2001, pp. 205-236; Tulia G. Falleti, “A Sequential Theory of Decentralization: Latin 
American Cases in Comparative Perspective”, The American Political Science Review, 
vol. 99, no. 3, August 2005, pp. 327-346, etc. 
18
  Clement Cottingham, “Political Consolidation and Centre-Local Relations in Senegal”, 
Canadian Journal of African Studies/Revue Canadienne des Études Africaines, vol. 4, 
no.1, Special Issue: “Local-Central Politics”, Winter 1970, pp. 101-120.  
19
  Dora Orlansky, “Decentralization Politics and Policies”, in Stuart S. Nagel (ed.), Critical 
Issues in Cross-national Public Administration: Privatization, Democratization, Decentralization, 
Greenwood Publishing, Westport (Connecticut), 2000, pp. 181-204/p. 196. 
20
  Shantayanan Devarajan, Stuti Khemani, Shekhar Shah, “The Politics of Partial 
Decentralization”, in Ahmad Ehtisham, Giorgio Brosio (eds.), Does Decentralization 
Enhance Service Delivery and Poverty Reduction ?, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham Glos 
(UK) & Northampton (Massachusetts), 2009, pp. 102-121/pp. 118-119. 
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decentralization. Quite interestingly, Merilee S. Grindle21 introduces the 
example of decentralization in Mexico, concluding that proper fiscal and 
administrative decentralization can result in high levels of political competition 
and satisfaction with the living in the town, both at the level of the local elites 
and the community. It becomes apparent that local leadership modifies its 
outlook and prioritization strategy in the context of change of administrative 
organization leading to increased decentralization. Jonathan Rodden22 presents 
the impact of different forms of decentralization upon the city management, but, 
most importantly, upon the degree of elite isolation and passive representation. 
Finally, opposing two main approaches with reference to the impact of 
decentralization policies – the “liberal-individualist” and “statist” approaches –, 
Aylin Topal23 describes forms of elite isolation after the proper implementation 
of decentralization policies and differences of agenda setting of local elites as 
response to increased decentralization. The fashion in which the elites’ outlook, 
value orientation and strategy prioritization actually modifies is partially 
elaborated in the present paper, with a special focus on particular municipalities 
in three countries of East-Central Europe: Romania, Czech Republic, and Poland. 
 
 
 
THE LEVEL OF DECENTRALIZATION IN ECE COUNTRIES 
AND ITS IMPACT ON LOCAL LEADERSHIP: 
A DISCUSSION 
 
 As a repercussion of the implementation of decentralization policies, 
the role, the prerogatives, and the attributions of the Municipal Councils and of 
the institution of the mayor increase exponentially. Therefore, the local political 
elite of decentralized communities are subject to the new context presupposed 
by decentralization, and they changed accordingly. The distribution and the 
amplitude of attributions at the local level, related to the central authority, 
should also be considered in the discussion regarding the typology of local 
government systems and these systems’ impact on elite outlook and attitude 
orientation. Such typologies have been instrumentally utilized by the literature 
for the purpose of explaining differences in  
 
                                                 
21
  Merilee Serrill Grindle, Going Local. Decentralization, Democratization and the Promise 
of Good Governance, Princeton University Press, Princeton (New Jersey), 2007, pp. 63-105. 
22
  Jonathan Rodden, “Comparative Federalism and Decentralization: On Meaning and 
Measurement”, Comparative Politics, vol. 36, no. 4, July 2004, pp. 481-500.  
23
  Aylin Topal, Boosting Competitiveness Through Decentralization. Subnational 
Comparison of Local Development in Mexico, Ashgate, Farnham Surrey (UK) & 
Burlington (Vermont), 2012. 
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 “recruitment patterns, professionalization, the position of mayors in local and multi-
level governance arrangements (or horizontal and vertical policy networks), the 
interpretation (or notion) of democracy, problem definition as well  as attitudes and 
opinions towards decentralization or centralization and reforms (‘modernization’) of the 
public sector (‘new public management’)”24. 
 
 This is particularly the reason why a short inquiry into the taxonomical 
diversity of local government systems is perceived as necessary at this point 
(see Table 2). 
 In the existing literature, the de facto degree of decentralization has 
been measured employing a series of complementary indicators: (1) the level of 
proclivity towards decentralization25; (2) the share of sub-national government 
to the public consumption or to the GDP level26; (3) other qualitative indicators, 
such as: government credibility, social capital27, soft or hard budget 
constraints28, levels of corruption, administrative capacity29, the magnitude of 
bureaucracy, etc. 
 The de facto degree of decentralization and its effective measurement 
represent a cumbersome topic for both political scientists and policy-drafters. 
Thus, besides the pieces of legislation establishing the functioning of the 
mechanisms presupposed by the said administrative process, additional markers 
and indicators should be equally considered, in order to determine the manner 
and the extent in which the legal framework is put into practice, is implemented 
and developed in the field. Probably the most commonly employed form of 
operationalizing the concept of “decentralization” is the one currently utilized 
                                                 
24
  Hubert Heinelt, Nikolaos-K. Hlepas, “Typologies of Local Government Systems”, in 
Henry Bäck, Hubert Heinelt, Annick Magnier (eds.), The European Mayor. Political 
Leaders in the Changing Context of Local Democracy, VS Verlag Für 
Sozialwissenschaften (Urban and Regional Research International), Wiesbaden & Berlin, 
2006, pp. 21-42. 
25
  Jonathan Dunn, Deborah Wetzel, “Fiscal Decentralization in Former Socialist Economies: 
Progress and Prospects”, in Proceedings. Annual Conference on Taxation and Minutes of 
the Annual Meeting of the National Tax Association. Atlanta (Georgia), Sunday 24th to 
Tuesday 26th October 1999, vol. 92, National Tax Association, Washington, D.C., 2000, 
pp. 242-250. 
26
  International Monetary Fund – IMF, Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, IMF, 
Washington, D.C., 2001. 
27
  Luiz De Mello, Can Fiscal Decentralization Strengthen Social Capital?, IMF Working 
Paper No. 129, Washington, D.C., 2000. 
28
  János Kornai, “Resource-Constrained versus Demand-Constrained Systems”, 
Econometrica, vol. 47, no. 4, July 1979, pp. 801-819; Idem, Economics of Shortage, 
North-Holland, Amsterdam (the Netherlands), 1980; Idem, “The Soft Budget Constraint”, 
Kyklos, vol. 39, no. 1, February 1986, pp. 3-30. 
29
  John J. Gargan, “Consideration of Local Government Capacity”, Public Administration 
Review, vol. 41, no. 6, November/December 1981, pp. 649-658. 
260  ROXANA MARIN 
 
Romanian Political Science Review  vol. XVII  no. 2  2017 
 
 
 
 
 
 
by the World Bank and the IMF in the issuing of their annual reports30 (See 
Table 1). 
 
Table 1 
The Proportion of Subnational Share of General Government Expenditure 
(Expressed As Percentage From the Total National Budget) 
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BULGARIA 2.17 59.53 44.11 8.30 68.95 26.69 12.19 31.70% 
CZECH 
REPUBLIC 
17.20 17.22 5.98 8.03 68.47 61.89 46.53 32.18% 
HUNGARY 6.86 46.99 44.83 11.99 74.10 43.97 27.64 36.62% 
POLAND 34.30 72.47 87.36 17.49 86.92 76.13 65.34 62.85% 
ROMANIA 4.80 9.23 0.36 2.97 83.01 34.74 17.55 21.80% 
SLOVAKIA 5.69 2.40 0.26 0.49 56.74 27.00 18.78 15.90% 
Source: International Monetary Fund, Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, IMF, 
Washington, D.C., 2001. 
The data is selected only for the countries of East-Central Europe, former satellites of USSR. 
 
 
METHODOLOGY: APPLICATIONS 
ON THREE CASE-STUDIES 
 
 The present study bears, as its prime scope, the exemplification of the 
theoretical considerations discussed above, regarding the level of 
decentralization of the administrations of the East-central European states, and 
their impact upon the outlook of the local political elites. This paper’s intention 
is to contribute to the existing literature and provide information regarding the 
modification in elite outlook and attitudinal patterns after a decentralization 
policy was implemented and has produced its effects. For achieving its 
objective, the present endeavour employs the positional approach in identifying 
and analyzing the local political elites, alongside the case-study as the main 
research method, using as populations the members of the Municipal/Local 
                                                 
30
  Along a series of domains of considerable interest at the local level (infrastructure, 
education, healthcare, public security, transportation, social services [including housing 
and unemployment relief], cultural and recreational activities, etc.), it evaluates the extent 
to which they are dealt with nationally, regionally and locally. This evaluation is 
constructed primarily based on pieces of legislation, bylaws, internal regulations of 
different administrative and executive bodies, as well as on some empirical endeavours 
undertaken by the World Bank and the IMF expertise. 
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Councils in three small-to-medium sized towns (approximately 35,000 
inhabitants), similar in terms of developmental strategies (i.e. food industry and 
service development, with commercial dominant), localized in three countries 
of the region: Tecuci (Galați county, Romania), Česká Lípa (Liberec region, the 
Czech Republic), and Oleśnica (Lower Silesia voivodeship, Poland)31.  
 For the purpose of accounting of differences in elite outlook, 
interactions, attitude orientation varying upon different forms and levels of 
decentralization, the paper assumes that the fashion in which the concept of 
“decentralization” is operationalized and instrumentalized in studies concerning 
                                                 
31
  Employing the most similar design systems, the selection of the cases follows a certain 
pattern determined by the accessibility of the populations under scrutiny and by this 
researcher’s capacities and capabilities in respect to the populations. The study has been 
initiated in Tecuci (December 2010), the author’s hometown, the place in which the 
capacity of reaching the subjects of this endeavor is considerable, while the accessibility 
of documents resulting from the daily activity of the Local Council increases 
significantly. Subsequently, the decision was made to embark on a comparative approach 
(July-August 2011), stationed on the region of East-Central Europe, with the next 
Municipal Council inquired to be that of one town located in the Czech Republic, since 
the country – though sharing with Romania the experience of almost half-a-century of 
state socialism, the repertoire of problems the democratic transition and market economy 
immanently trigger, and confronting the same general paradigm of “East-Central 
Europeness” – has positioned itself, during the years following the communist 
breakdown, better politically and economically, as compared to Romania, hence bearing 
elites who have more comprehensively internalized the democratic values, norms and 
“rules of the game”. The selection of the town of Česká Lípa among the Czech towns was 
partly the result of random convenience sampling, based, firstly, on the selection of those 
towns in the Czech Republic comprising 30,000-42,000 inhabitants and basing its 
economic developmental strategy on agro-alimentary industry and trade, commercial 
activities (i.e. the two main characteristics of Tecuci to be primarily isolated in other 
cases); twenty-two towns fitted this initial profile. Secondly, e-mails were sent to the 
Mayor’s Office, the Information Office, and to the municipal councilors of each of the 
initially selected towns; the e-mails contained a short presentation of the research and its 
results on Tecuci, the proposal for collaboration to the research, by the filling in of the 
questionnaire attached and the access to the Municipal Council’s documents, and the 
motivation of taking into consideration the said towns. This approach resulted in 
responses received from four communities: the collaboration in the view of answering the 
questionnaire and providing the necessary documents was possible and continued with the 
representatives of the municipality of Česká Lípa. The Polish case was considered 
differently: the town of Oleśnica and its Municipal Council have been chosen due to their 
proximity to the city of Wrocław, where this researcher spent the period September 2012-
February 2013. The populations on which the questionnaire was administered 
counted: 19 local councilors for Tecuci, 25 municipal councils for Česká Lípa, and 21 
municipal councilors for Oleśnica. The similarity of the three cases, in terms of 
demographics and developmental strategies, was perceived as paramount for the study, 
regardless of the fact that rejoinders would arise from the degree of representativeness of 
the three towns for their own country. On the other hand, indeed, the representativeness of 
each town for its country might significantly impact on the very agenda setting and on the 
decisions on development strategies. 
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the “local-central” relations has been frequently founded on a de jure, rather 
legalist, perspective. Undoubtedly, the legislation represents an important 
indicator for establishing a series of traits or different levels of decentralization 
to be subsequently identified and measured throughout the region. Nevertheless, 
the legislation in each case has presented and continues to present significant 
contingencies in actual implementation, triggered mainly by the autonomous 
administration of local finances. The present paper employs the World 
Bank/IMF averages indexes of sub-national share of general government 
expenditure in the operationalization of “decentralization” (See Table 1); the 
paper adds to these indexes three thresholds: (a) a significant level of 
administrative and fiscal decentralization describes the countries whose average 
sub-national share of general government expenditure is higher than 50%; (b) a 
standard level of decentralization is specific for those countries with an average 
local and regional share of general government expenditure higher than 30%, 
but lower than 50%; and (c) a low level of decentralization characterizes the 
countries with a sub-national share of general government expenditure lower 
than 30%32.  
 With the assistance of a pre-eminently quantitative research (the 
administration of a written questionnaire), and qualitative one, as well 
(document analysis on the national pieces of legislation and on the Councils’ 
decisions, participative observation), considerations have been detailed 
regarding: (a) the local elites’ interactions with other groups, and (b) the 
perceptions towards key-aspects of the consolidating democracies of the region: 
decentralization and local autonomy, the level of satisfaction as one of the 
inhabitants of the town.  
Therefore, the main research question of the study is:  
What is the impact of the specific level of decentralization in each country 
on the outlook and priorities of the local political elites in the three cases? 
From the utilization of the specific research methods, a series of 
tendencies are observable, which the present study associates and correlates 
with the degree of administrative decentralization of the three systems of local 
government discussed here33. From the analysis of the chosen cases, the 
hypotheses are the following:  
                                                 
32
  The thresholds were established taking into consideration the average index of 
decentralization for the region of East-Central Europe (33%): an average, standard level 
of decentralization would be placed around the value of 30% of the budget expenditure as 
sub-national share. Equally, a sub-national share of the total budget expenditure that is 
exceeding 50% is to be considered significant, high. 
33
  Cf. Roxana Marin, “Instances of Decentralization in East-Central Europe: 
Operationalization, Taxonomy and Applications on Local Political Elites’ Outlook”, 
Romanian Journal of Political Science, vol. 14, no. 2, Winter 2014, pp. 99-125; Idem, 
“Democratic Elitism at the Local Level and Local Governance in East-Central Europe. A 
Comparative Assessment on the Elites of Tecuci (Romania), Česká Lípa (the Czech 
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 Hypothesis 1: The more significant the level of decentralization, the 
more isolated the local political elite becomes. Thus, it establishes 
preponderantly local relations, and closes its access to the central 
administration/elite, while presenting a higher degree of localism in cultural-
geographical identification.  
 Hypothesis 2: The higher the level of decentralization in the system of 
local government, the more reserved, realistic the attitude manifested by the 
local political elites towards the benefits of the decentralization panacea. 
 Hypothesis 3: The higher the level of decentralized administration, the 
more satisfied the political elite feels as inhabiting the town which it represents. 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
 
 Hypothesis 1: A Localized and Isolated Political Elite34 
 
 It is important to note that the local elite of Oleśnica – the most 
decentralized community – is the most localized group, as compared to the 
other two cases, in terms of the networks of power and interactions with elite 
groups at the national level. None of the members of the Municipal Council of 
Oleśnica establishes contacts with members of the central administration; only 
2.63%35 of the respondents in the Polish case have interactions with political 
representatives at the level of the voievodship (regional). The frequency of 
interactions with other local elected officials is similar: 2.63% of the councilors 
in Oleśnica establish such relations, the lowest percentage among the three 
                                                                                                                       
Republic) and Oleśnica (Poland)”, in Stelian Scăunaș, Vasile Tabără, Eugen Străuțiu 
(eds.), Political Science, International Relations and Security Studies. International 
Conference Proceedings, the VIIth Edition, Sibiu, 24-26 May 2013, Department of 
International Relations, Political Science and Security Studies (Faculty of Social Sciences 
and Humanities), “Lucian Blaga” University of Sibiu, Sibiu, 2013, pp. 29-56; Idem, 
“Incomplete Modernization and State Socialism in East-Central Europe. A Framework of 
Analysis of Post-Communist Local Political Elites”, in Daniel Dumitran, Valer Moga 
(eds.), Economy and Society in Central and Eastern Europe: Territory, Population, 
Consumption. Papers of the International Conference Held in Alba Iulia, April 25th-27th, 
2013, LIT Verlag, Wien, Zürich & Berlin & Münster, 2013, pp. 363-379. 
34
  See Figure 1: The Interactions of the Local Political Elites, the comparative graphical 
representation of the results of the administered questionnaire (Q8) on the municipal 
councilors of the three communities.  
35
  Although acknowledging the limitations sprung from the small number of units of 
analysis in the selected populations, the paper expresses the results of the administered 
questionnaire as percentages rather in order to illustrate trends and main orientations in 
the responses gathered than to assign clear statistical value. 
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cases analyzed: 11.11% in the case of Česká Lípa and a more robust 19.51% in 
Tecuci.  
 Overall, the members of the Municipal Council in Oleśnica are the most 
isolated group in terms of the networks of power and elite interactions, hence 
being the most circumscribed elite group among the three cases, only 5.26% of 
the local councilors establishing contacts with other groups transcending the 
limits of their constituencies, as opposed to 31.68% for Tecuci and 12.69% for 
Česká Lípa.  
 The increased isolation with the Czech and the Polish local political 
elites is to be explained through the prism of the more and more significant 
degree of decentralization, hence confirming the first hypothesis: in both the 
Czech and the Polish cases, the local elite focuses primarily on the immediate 
issues their communities face, linking their interests to those of the groups 
acting within these communities, while the contacts with elites outside the town 
they represent become increasing sporadic and improbable. On the other hand, 
the most important relations the local political elite in Oleśnica entertains within 
the community are those with the neighborhood groups – 39.47% of the 
responses – and, more significantly, with the civic and reform groups – 21.05%. 
Comparably, the percentage – and thusly, the importance – assigned to the 
relations of elites with the neighborhood is the highest in the Polish case and, 
overall, the highest among all types of groups considered here and among all 
three cases, discrepantly higher as compared to the Romanian (12.19%) and the 
Czech (only 7.93%) cases, a situation which points to the closeness between the 
members of the Municipal Council and their immediate constituency.  
 Such type of relations, though they may appear trivial and insignificant 
in the entire political dynamic, bears a particular role especially in the process 
of re-election of the local leaders in small-to-medium communities, particularly 
in the case of extramural selection of elites, as it is the case of Polish local 
elites. Such an interaction is non-mediated, immediate and probably the 
simplest form the local leaders can establish with their constituency. The Polish 
local elite seem to have understood this key aspect the best. Regarding the local 
councillors’ interaction with close friends and supporters, such contacts should 
be cumulatively discussed with those with the neighbourhood: 49.99% for 
Oleśnica, 29.26% for Tecuci and 20.62% for Česká Lípa. 
 To a considerable distance from the value assigned to the relation with 
the neighbourhood groups, the increased frequency of the links between the 
Council and the civic and reform groups represents a conspicuous and telling 
feature of good local governance and of democratic development at the 
community level: the Polish percentages in this area are similar to the Czech 
ones (21.05% to 25.39%) and dissimilar to the Romanian case (only 4.87% of 
the municipal councilors’ contacts).  
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 The repercussions of the dominance of those groups among the 
municipal councillors’ links are twofold. On the one hand, the predominance of 
these connections  suggests a profound isolation of the members of the Council 
to their immediate constituency, with the almost complete neglect of the 
networks of power at the central or regional level (possibly explainable through 
an increased degree of decentralization after 1998 that determined intrinsically a 
local elite more focused, almost circumscribed to the community they represent, 
due to the increased authority and capacity to actually implement changes, 
rather than pushing and negotiating for them with the central administration). It 
is among these groups that the Municipal Council extracts grievances, problems 
to be dealt with, issues to be solved. On the other hand, the conspicuous 
prominence of this type of contacts, rather informal and non-formalized, non-
institutionalized, is prone to generate a general absence of critique in respect to 
the political performances of the municipal councillors and to bear the seeds of 
phenomena located at the margins of political structure – particularly recurrent 
in the political compendium offered by East-Central Europe –, such as 
patronage and clientelism. While, indeed, the growing frequency of relations 
with neighbourhood groups, with close friends and supporters is instrumental in 
taking the pulse of the local demands and expectations, these forms of 
interactions are, at the same time, unlikely to produce criticism directed towards 
the performances of the Municipal Council and, more often than not, the local 
councillor has to respond somehow to the unconditional help and support he 
receives from these groups, strategically placing individuals belonging to such 
groups within the local administration apparatus. Clientelistic practices of this 
fashion are rather commonplace for Tecuci, where the political elite largely 
coincides with the economic one; frequently, members of the parties 
represented in the Council are seen to colonize the local administration, 
generally undertaking petty jobs, but secured with the very incumbency of their 
“patrons” in the Council.  
 Expectedly, the “consensual” type of relations dominates among the 
interactions with close friends, supporters and neighbours. Yet another aspect 
appears problematic in this form of interaction: the 50% of the contacts with 
supporters, friends, sympathizers and alike is by no means compensated, 
counterbalanced by the poor 23.68% describing the frequency and importance 
of the contacts established by the councillors with two other groups, generally 
perceived to voice criticism towards the situation of the town, the situation of 
particular social groups in the composition of the town and towards the political 
performance of the local elite: the unions (2.63%)36 and the civic and reform 
                                                 
36
  The very low frequency of interactions with the civic groups, but, more so, with the 
unions bears, actually, a twofold explanation. Part of the explanation lies in the very fact 
that unions and the civic groups are essentially weak at the local level, with virtually no 
voice and impact on policy making and agenda setting. For the endemic weakness of 
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groups (21.05%). Finally, the interactions with the business groups might 
constitute another source of “contestation” and criticism at the local level 
towards the political elite of the town. The political elite in Tecuci tends to 
confound itself with the economic one and the local leadership of Oleśnica is 
quasi-synonymous with particular segments of the civic and reform groups.  
 
Figure 1. The Interactions of the Local Political Elites. 
Source: Results of the administered questionnaire; author’s own collected data. 
 
 The geographical identification of the local political elite37 was 
considered in order to correlate it with the level of localism and isolation of the 
ruling groups of small-to-medium communities. Stronger links and power 
networks formed and maintained at the local level suggest localism and, 
subsequently, a more pronounced focus on the local priorities and, conversely, 
an isolation with respect to the national concerns. Similarly, it might be 
                                                                                                                       
unions in Romania (and in East-Central Europe, generally), see: Georgeta Ghebrea, 
“Reinventing Trade Unions in Romania: Building Legitimacy in a Changing Society”, in 
Craig Phelan (ed.), Trade Union Revitalisation: Trends and Prospects in 34 Countries, 
Peter Lang, Bern, 2007, pp. 379-394. 
37
  See Figures 2, 3, 4: The Cultural-Geographical Identification of the Local Political Elites, 
the comparative graphical representations of the results of the administered questionnaire 
(Q13) on the municipal councilors of the three towns.  
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hypothesized that a geographical identification inclined towards localism (i.e. 
the cases in which the local councillors identify primarily with their native 
municipalities, with the town they presently represent or with the region which 
they inhabit) is prone to generate an emphasis on local problems, perceived as 
taking precedence over the “national interests”. Considering these observations, 
the Municipal Council in Oleśnica expectedly exposes a high degree of 
localism, as 50% of the members of the Council identify first and foremost with 
the municipality they politically represent and govern, the town of Oleśnica; 
another 15% of the councilors bear a particular attachment towards the native 
town/village, thus making localism in geographical identification a 
characteristic pertaining to 65% of the Council. Regional identification38 is 
featured by only 15% of the councilors. The national identification remains 
strong, even though hardly compensating for the powerful localism: 15% 
identify culturally and geographically primarily with Poland, considering the 
“national interests” taking precedence over the local ones. In comparison with 
the results for the Romanian and the Czech cases, the Polish case presents a 
more dispersed range of sources of identification, a multilayered and 
multifaceted one. At least six layers of geographical and cultural identification 
are acknowledged and given due consideration by the respondents: there are, 
firstly, a native source of identification, and a local per se identification; 
secondly, there are complementary, regional sources of identification, the 
county/province (the powiat), and the region (the województwa); thirdly, there 
is an almost inherent national source of identification; and fourthly, there is an 
additional “European identity”. The scheme appears significantly reduced, 
compressed, in the other two cases: in Tecuci, only four types of cultural-
geographical identification are considered by the councilors (the native, the 
local, the regional and the national ones), while, in Česká Lípa, the matrix 
includes four sources as well, though slightly different from the ones considered 
in the case of Tecuci, due especially to different forms of administrative 
organization of the territory between the two (native, local, provincial, 
regional). Part of the discrepancies among the three cases in respect to the 
cultural-geographical identification springs from the very administrative 
arrangements of each country under scrutiny. But the differences lie also in the 
degree of openness each elite group inquired here actually display. Indeed, the 
level of localism is dominant for all cases, though quite dissimilar as numerical 
value: 65% in Oleśnica, 72.72% in Tecuci, 92.29% in Česká Lípa; it results 
that, as a matter of fact, the local elite in Oleśnica is the least isolated, which 
would, to a certain extent, stand against the isolation of the same group when 
                                                 
38
  The territorial-administrative division specific to the Polish administration, labeled powiat 
is somewhere in-between the municipality (the gmina), and the region (the województwa, 
the voivodship). 
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considering their overwhelmingly local connections and networks of power. 
Among the three Local Councils, the Romanian local elite is the more inclined 
towards a national identification (18.18%) in stark opposition to the Czech elite 
that acknowledged no such source of identification (testifying once more to the 
extremely localized character of the elite in Česká Lípa). All in all, the average 
level of localism among the three cases is 76.67%, that of regionalism mounts 
to 11.87% of the entire population comprised in the three Municipal Councils, 
while that of nationalism is 11.06%.  
 
Figures 2, 3, 4. The Cultural-Geographical Identification of the Local Elite. 
(Q13: Which of the cultural and territorial entities do you identify yourself with firstly?) 
Source: Results of the administered questionnaire; author’s own collected data. 
 
 
 Hypothesis 2: Attitudes Towards Decentralization 
 
 Measuring the perceptions of the local elite towards larger local 
autonomy and decentralization is instrumental because it provides an insight 
into the acknowledgement of various levels of authority in the leadership of the 
community. The largest palette of attributions belongs to the Municipal Council 
which undertakes the regulation tasks in most of the spheres of the community 
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life, including social services, public improvements, education, healthcare, 
cultural and recreation activities. Inversely, there is a side effect to a more 
comprehensive and extended decentralization: larger local autonomy and 
decentralization means primarily an effective say of the municipality on the 
local budget; as a consequence, it lies in the capacity of the local municipality to 
properly collect taxes and to efficiently administer the budgetary revenues 
thusly collected in order to actually effect changes in the various domains of 
competence under its direct supervision. With greater decentralization come 
greater authority and the ability to have a tremendous say in the conduct of the 
community’s affairs, but, conversely, it also comes a great deal of responsibility 
in handling the ever-increasing problems the community confronts with. 
Balancing the advantages with the drawbacks of decentralization and autonomy 
at the local level, the members of the Municipal Council of Oleśnica position 
themselves somewhere in between the enthusiasm of the local elite in Tecuci 
(100% approval of greater decentralization, with a core of 64.7% approving and 
another 11.76% strongly approving decentralization) and the rather cautious 
pragmatism of the local elite in Česká Lípa (experienced in both the good points 
and the disadvantages decentralization presupposes, with 77.26% approving or 
partially approving and another 22.72% disagreeing with larger local autonomy 
and decentralization)39. The Polish local political elite displays a sense of 
realism, properly understanding the mechanisms encapsulated by decentralizing 
a greater range of responsibilities in the local authority’s sphere of competence, 
as 43.75% of the municipal councilors generally agree with decentralization. 
The acceptance of the Polish elites towards decentralization is significantly less 
than the case of Tecuci (64.70%), but slightly higher than the Czech case 
(40.9%). Relevant, as well, in Oleśnica, the municipal councilors display the 
highest proportion of strong acceptance of decentralization and the perspective 
of autonomous entities in the Polish administrative arrangement: 25% of the 
respondents, as opposed to none in the case of Česká Lípa and only 11.76% in 
the case of Tecuci. Decentralization worked its charms in Poland, while being 
partially contested in the Czech Republic and unaccomplished and high 
problematic in Romania. A very thin proportion of 6.25% of councilors in 
Oleśnica bluntly state that they disagree with the projects of decentralization 
and local autonomy, being largely disappointed with the feasibility and the 
efficiency of these projects; this disapproval is totally absent among the local 
councilors in Tecuci, but quite present among the councilors in Česká Lípa 
(22.72%). In Oleśnica, decentralization produced positive effects and a more 
suitable management at the local level; consequently, the attitudes of the local 
                                                 
39
  See Figure 5: The Local Political Elites’ Attitudes Towards Decentralization, the 
comparative graphical representation of the results of the administered questionnaire 
(Q11) on the municipal councilors of the three towns.  
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elite towards it mirror generally the experience this elite has had with the reality 
of increased devolution and growing array of authority and responsibility. 
 
Figure 5. The Local Political Elites’ Attitudes Towards Decentralization. 
Source: Results of the administered questionnaire; author’s own collected data. 
 
 
 Hypothesis 3: Satisfaction with the Life in the Town 
 
 The satisfaction of the municipal councillors of being inhabitants of the 
municipality they represent might constitute an indicator of the fashion in which 
they evaluate their political performance in managing the town’s problems. Not 
surprisingly, the unrestrained enthusiasm of the members of the Municipal 
Council in Oleśnica transpires in the evaluation of the satisfaction felt by 
inhabiting the town: an impressive 47.05% of the councillors feel very satisfied 
living in Oleśnica and another equally impressive 52.94% declare they are 
satisfied inhabiting the town40. Actually, the entire Council concentrates around 
                                                 
40
  See Figure 6: The Local Political Elites’ Level of Satisfaction with the Living in their 
Town, the comparative graphical representation of the results of the administered 
questionnaire (Q15) on the municipal councilors of the three communities.  
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higher degrees of satisfaction of living in Oleśnica. This enthusiasm is 
unparalleled by any of the other two cases: although the members of the 
Councils in both Tecuci and Česká Lípa show high levels of satisfaction as 
inhabitants of their communities (fairly satisfied is characteristic for 58.82% of 
the councillors in Tecuci and for 72.72% in Česká Lípa), cumulatively it is the 
Municipal Council of Oleśnica that accounts for the highest percentage of very 
satisfied elites in respect to the outlook of their community. Comparatively, 
there is no councillor to be very satisfied of living in Tecuci and a feeble 4.54% 
very satisfied of being part of the community in Česká Lípa; the degree of 
satisfaction of inhabiting Oleśnica is more than ten times higher than that in the 
Czech case. In the case of the Local Council of Oleśnica, there is also an almost 
unnoticeable difference between those very satisfied and those fairly satisfied 
(5.89%), whereas in the case of Česká Lípa and Tecuci, the difference 
impressively climbs at 68.18% and 58.82%, respectively. A reasonable 
proportion of dissatisfaction in respect to being an inhabitant of the town is 
inherent within the Municipal Councils of Tecuci (29.41% of the councilors) 
and of Česká Lípa (22.72%); the Romanian case further displays a sentiment of 
profound dissatisfaction among the elite inhabiting the town (11.76%), in 
contrast to the other two cases, in which no such strong dissatisfaction is 
encountered within the elite groups. The strong satisfaction of the Polish local 
elite towards inhabiting the town and towards the conditions, advantages, 
benefits and privileges the town can offer is intimately correlated with their 
assessment of the positive direction in which the town is heading and with their 
evaluation of their own political performances in crucial, focal areas and sphere 
of competence at the local level (e.g. public improvements, infrastructure, 
healthcare, education, cultural & youth & sports activities, social services and 
public security). Moreover, the confidence and the enthusiasm of the local 
political elites in Oleśnica are revelatory for a dynamic community. There is 
also some form of local pride among the members of the Municipal Council that 
nurtures in this enthusiasm, a propensity towards localism and immediate 
proximity that stresses on the achievements and the accomplishments the 
community registered through local governance after the initiation of the 
decentralization process after 1998.  
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Figure 6. The Local Political Elites’ Level of Satisfaction with the Living in their Town. 
Source: Results of the administered questionnaire; author’s own collected data. 
 
 
A TENTATIVE TYPOLOGY OF LOCAL ELITES  
FACING DECENTRALIZATION 
 
 Three types of local political elites appear distinct from the study of the 
Municipal Councils in the three case-studies. Quite clearly, the different levels, 
types and experiences of decentralization in East-Central Europe have generated 
seemingly different “elite outlooks”, different strategy prioritization, different 
manners of interaction with other groups, etc. For better accounting for the 
future research and for the resulting differences among the cases, this paper 
advances a threefold classification of local political leadership, constructed 
employing mainly two explanatory trajectories, one of the being discussed at 
some length here: (a) the level of administrative-fiscal decentralization specific 
for each country under scrutiny, and (b) the “legacy” of the former communist 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
Very satisfied b+c Satisfied (+
partially satisfied)
Unsatisfied Very unsatisfied
47,05%
52,94%
0,00% 0,00%0,00%
58,82%
29,41%
11,76%
4,54%
72,72%
22,72%
0,00%
Q15: How satisfied are you as an inhabitant of the town of Tecuci/ Česká 
Lípa/ Oleśnica ?
Oleśnica Tecuci Česká Lípa
Decentralization in East-Central Europe  273 
 
Romanian Political Science Review  vol. XVII  no. 2  2017 
 
 
 
 
 
 
regime, expressed through the type of “elite political culture”41. Thusly, the 
study favours the differentiation among three types of elites, underpinned on the 
specific content of elite political culture and on the set of attributions provided 
by a certain degree of decentralization (See the Annexes): (1) “predominantly 
elitistic” (e.g. Tecuci), (2) “democratic elitist” (e.g. Česká Lípa), and (3) 
“predominantly democratic” (e.g. Oleśnica)42. The logic of this distinction is 
that different levels of decentralization and the specific inheritance of the ancien 
régime influence the gap between the elites and their constituencies, creating 
specific types of local “elite distinctiveness”. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Clearly, the level and the manner of decentralization process undertaken 
in each of the three East-Central European countries (Romania, Czech Republic, 
and Poland) have generated different outcomes in the local elites’ attitudes, 
prioritization, and interactions. More significant levels of administrative and 
fiscal decentralization indicate a more responsible, pragmatic local elite, though 
largely isolated to the central authorities and skeptical, cautious, regarding the 
edulcorated image of the benefits of decentralization. Conversely, a low level of 
decentralization is prone to determine an elite who is prepared to acknowledge 
political responsibility only for those “soft” spheres of policy-design and 
implementation at the local level; they seem impotent to act effectively locally 
in such domains as economic and infrastructural development, for instance. Yet, 
the impact of decentralization on the “impoverishment” of small-to-medium-
sized towns – as are those studied here – remains an open question, worthy of 
proper and comprehensive consideration.  
 The envisaged study proposes a more encompassing approach, 
extended to the cases of other countries of former Sovietized Europe (Bulgaria, 
Hungary, Slovakia), employing the tentative typology proposed by the paper, 
hence further testing its validity. The features, definitions and types of 
decentralization differ greatly from one instance to the other. It is particularly 
this diversity that entails differences in the local “elite (general) outlook”, i.e. its 
attitudes, priorities, value orientations, interactions, profiles, degree of 
representativeness, patterns of recruitment, etc. Indeed, the contention this paper 
advances refers precisely to the impact of the degree of decentralization upon 
the general portrait of the local political elite. Three such impacts are discussed 
                                                 
41
  Kenneth Jowitt, “The Leninist Legacy”, in Vladimit Tismăneanu (ed.), Revolutions of 
1989, Routledge, London & New York, 1999, pp. 207-223; Stephen E. Hanson, “The 
Leninist Legacy and Institutional Change”, Comparative Political Studies, vol. 28, no. 2, 
July 1995, pp. 306-314. 
42
  Cf. Roxana Marin, “Democratic Elitism…cit.”, pp. 29-56. 
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here, namely the impact of the level of decentralization on: (a) local elite’s 
interactions, (b) local elite’s attitude towards decentralization itself, and (c) 
local elite’s satisfaction with the life in their town. Nevertheless, these 
differences in the local elite’s “outlook” in East-Central Europe cannot and 
should not be traced back to the level of decentralization alone. Due to the 
limitations of this study, other, equally important, independent variables 
explaining the variations for the selected cases, are not considered (e.g. the 
“legacy of the former regime” and different “elite political cultures”43, patterns 
of recruitment, the “system” variables, such as the characteristics of the political 
and the party systems, the tradition of “decentralization”, etc.), variables which 
remain instrumental in accounting for the results. The paper acknowledges also 
other significant limitations, such as: matters of representativeness and 
significance in the case selection (the actual limits of “the most similar systems” 
research design); the shortcomings in generalization and statistical analysis, due 
to the small number of units of analysis; the limits of comparison, due to the 
actual relevance of the selected cases, and those sprung from the employ of the 
questionnaire as the main method of data collection; the operationalization of 
“decentralization” using exclusively one indicator, etc. While being aware of 
the important limitations, this endeavor might contribute significantly to the 
existing literature on the effects of decentralization on the portrait of the local 
leadership in East-Central Europe. Further research on other countries and 
regions undergoing processes of decentralization or democratization (e.g. Latin 
America, south-east Asia, India, etc.) might add a comparative note on the 
present endeavor.    
 
 
                                                 
43
 Kenneth Jowitt, “The Leninist…cit.”, pp. 207-223. 
  
Annexes 
 
A Typology of Local Political Elites in East-Central Europe 
 
I. Type of local political elite: “predominantly elitistic”; 
- level of decentralization: low; 
- type of local government system44:  
(1) vertical power relations45:  
(1.a.) “mixed”46;  
(1.b.) “Southern” hybrid47;  
(1.c.) the “clientelistic/ patronage model” (“support”)48, the 
“market-enabling model”49;  
(1.d.) the “Central-East European type”50.  
(2) horizontal power relations:  
(2.a.) accentuated “dualistic”51; 
                                                 
44
  The legislation to be considered for the three case studies was: Law No. 215/2001 on 
Local Public Administration, for Romania; the 1990-1994 legislative series –
Constitutional Act No. 294/1990 Col.; Act of the Czech National Council No. 367/1990 
Col. on Municipalities, amended as 410/1992; Act of the Czech National Council 
No. 425/1990 Col. on District Offices, the Regulation of the Sphere of Their Activities; 
amendments to Acts of the Czech National Council No. 266/1991, No. 542/1991, 
Act No. 21/1992, Act No. 403/1992, Act No. 152/1994 and Act No. 254/1994 –, for the 
Czech Republic; and Law of March 8, 1998 on Local Self-government, for Poland.  
45
  One might raise the criticism that fitting the three East-Central European cases of 
decentralization into the existing, Western-typed typologies is a rather procrustean task, 
since such cases are rather “hybrid”, “catch-all” ones (see, for instance, Pawel Swianiewicz, 
Adam Mielczarek, “Parties and Political Culture in Central and Eastern European Local 
Governments”, in Gabor Soos, Violetta Zentai [eds.], Faces of Local Democracy: 
Comparative Papers from Central and Eastern Europe, Open Society Institute, Budapest, 
2005, pp. 13-78). However, the present attempt is founded on the need for particularizing 
the three cases and tentatively pinpointing the discrepancies between them.  
46
  Robert John Bennett, Territory and Administration in Europe, Frances Pinter, London, 
1989; Idem, “European Local Government Systems”, in Idem (ed.), Local Government in 
the New Europe, Belhaven Press, London & New York, 1993, pp. 28-47. 
47
  Edward C. Page, Michael J.F. Goldsmith, Central and Local Government Relations: A 
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(2.b) “consociational”;  
(2.c) the “semi-presidentialism” (“dualism” + “consociationalism”, 
with majoritarian traces)52. 
- the “legacy” of the ancien régime: “patrimonial”, “modernizing-
nationalizing” communism; 
- degree of (geographical) isolation: significant, still low at elite level; 
- strategy prioritization: culture, social services, public improvements + 
low political responsibility; 
- patterns of recruitment: intramural selection; the dominance of 
national/ regional selectorates; 
- attitudes towards decentralization: unrestrained enthusiasm; 
- attitudes towards democracy: “statists-anti-egalitarianists”; “populists”; 
- quality-based profile: “ethical” + “political” models; 
- level of “elite distinctiveness” and representativeness: high, but 
standard level of passive representativeness. 
 
II. Type of local political elite: “democratic elitist”; 
- level of decentralization: standard; 
- type of local government system: 
(1) vertical power relations: 
(1.a.) “fused”;  
(1.b.) “Northern”-styled;  
(1.c.) the “economic-development model” (“partnership”), the 
“market-enabling model”;  
(1.d.) the “Central-East European type”.  
(2) horizontal power relations:  
(2.a.) moderate-to-weak “dualistic”; 
(2.b) “majoritarian”;  
(2.c) hybrid “presidentialism” (“dualism” + “majoritarianism”), 
with “parliamentarian” tendencies. 
- the “legacy” of the ancien régime: “bureaucratic-authoritarian”, 
“welfare” communism;   
- degree of (geographical) isolation: high, including at elite level; 
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- strategy prioritization: social services, culture, public safety + 
high level of political responsibility; 
- patterns of recruitment: intramural selection; the autonomy of 
local selectorates; localized political movements, mergers, splinters; 
- attitudes towards decentralization: general approval, but realistic 
(reserved) stance; 
- attitudes towards democracy: “statists-egalitarianists”; “democrats”; 
- quality-based profile: “ethical” + “pragmatic” models; 
- level of “elite distinctiveness” and representativeness: pondered by 
high level of dedication to the community; very low passive representativeness. 
 
III. Type of local political elite: “predominantly democratic” 
- level of decentralization: standard; 
- type of local government system: 
(1) vertical power relations: 
(1.a.) “dual”;  
(1.b.) “Northern”-styled;  
(1.c.) the “welfare-state model” (“social empathy/ sensitivity”), 
the “market-enabling model”;  
(1.d.) the “Central-East European type”.  
(2) horizontal power relations:  
(2.a.) accentuated “dualistic”; 
(2.b) “consociational”;  
(2.c) the “semi-presidentialism” (“dualism” + “consociationalism”, 
with majoritarian traces)53. 
- the “legacy” of the ancien régime: “national-accommodative”  
- degree of (geographical) isolation: high 
- strategy prioritization: public improvements, culture, education, 
social services + high political responsibility; 
- patterns of recruitment: extramural selection; 
- attitudes towards decentralization: cautious enthusiasm; 
- attitudes towards democracy: “statists-egalitarianists”; “populists”; 
- quality-based profile: “pragmatic” model; 
- level of “elite distinctiveness” and representativeness: low, with 
significantly low passive representativeness, pondered by “social 
sensitivity”. 
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